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Abstract 
This paper reports the results of experiments involving a 3-person coalition formation game with 
an ultimatum bargaining character. The grand coalition was always the efficient coalition 
decision, whereas the values of the 2-person coalitions are varied such that they lead to an 
efficiency loss in the range of 6.7 up to 30 percent. Furthermore, the 2-person coalition implies 
social exclusion, since the not chosen member always receives a payoff of zero. Consistent 
with results reported in the literature on 2-person ultimatum bargaining experiments, negative 
reciprocity (i.e. punishment of unfair offers) plays a crucial role in decision making. The 
hypothesis that selfishness and anticipated negative reciprocity by proposers together with 
actual negative reciprocal behavior of responders lead to inefficient outcomes and social 
exclusion is strongly supported by the data. It turns out that a huge majority of proposers 
choose the inefficient and unfair 2-person coalition. Proposer-induced efficiency losses vary 
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